Approved For Release 2000/09M1/0 ₽©+A-RDR79S01014A001000010032-3

10 March 1953

MEMORANDIM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: SE-39: SUGGESTED PARAGRAPHS TO LEAD OFF SECTION II

TROBABLE CONCESSION OF THE DEATH OF STALIN II

A. Effects on the Bases of Soviet Power

The economic and military bases of Coviet power are welikely to be immediately affected by Stalin's death. However, it may shake the political base of Soviet power and reduce the ability of the new leadership to maintain and strongthen the economic and military bases of Soviet power.

The office of on whether we western diplomatic or psychological moves weeks effect Seviet stability and strength connot be estimated without knowledge of the contemplated moves. However, if the West, over the coming months and years, can show calm unity and can increase its economic and military power, difficult divisive policy issues may be created within the new Soviet leadership. The discord and conflict caused by these divisive issues would probably be increased by personal rivalries for power, and would reduce Soviet peoper and the cohesion of the international Communist movement.

(sherp)

TERMAN RELAT Assistant Director, W.

BOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

DECLASSIFIED GLASS, CHANGED TOI TS S C NOT REVIEW DATE: -Acade Kar F. J. BATE OT JAK 81 REVESWEDS 1 5557 18557 dipie april. activis.

Security Information

Approved For Release 2000/09/11: CIA-RDP79S01041A001000010032-3



10 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: SE-39: SUGGESTED PARAGRAPHS TO LEAD OFF SECTION II

II. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN

A. Effects on the Bases of Soviet Power

The economic and military bases of Soviet power are unlikely to be immediately affected by Stalin's death. However, it may shake the political base of Soviet power and reduce the ability of the new leadership to maintain and strengthen the economic and military bases of Soviet power.

Whether or not any Western diplomatic or psychological moves would affect Soviet stability and strength cannot be estimated without knowledge of the contemplated moves. However, if the West, over the coming months and years, can show calm unity and can increase its economic and military power, difficult divisive policy issues may be created within the new Soviet leadership. The discord and conflict caused by these divisive issues would probably be increased by personal rivalries for power, and would reduce Soviet power and the cohesion of the international Communist movement.

SHERMAN KENT Assistant Director, NE

BOGUMENT NO					_
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.					
DEGLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO:					
NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 70-2					
DATE 27 JAN SIREY	IEWE	R:	_018	8557	7